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In  this  paper,  we  compare  the  distribution  of  price  changes  between  collusive  and  non-
collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We 
extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none 
of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation 
between  competition  and  cartel.  Therefore,  we  implement  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test. 
According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price 
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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical method that consistently measures 
changes in price variation caused by cartel conduct, which can be used by antitrust authorities 
to screen alleged illegal collusion. The approach can also be useful as an additional technique 
for establishing damages in antitrust legal proceedings concerning price fixing agreements. 
Previous studies have found many different characteristics for identifying collusive 
behaviour. For example, Porter and Zona (1993, 1999) or Bajari and Ye (2003) concentrate 
on  some  selected  bidding  markets  and  demonstrate  the  difference  between  collusive  and 
competitive bidding behaviour. For studies that analyze price dispersion in order to detect 
collusive behaviour, see Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), Connor (2005), Bolotova et al. (2008) 
and Blanckenburg and Geist (2009). All focus, with different methods, only on the first two 
moments of price variation (mean and variance). We show that this is inadequate as a means 
of detecting cartel activity in markets in general, because mean and price variation could be 
affected, for example, by price trends. To make it clearer, if we do not observe, for example, a 
substantial increase in prices during the observation period, it does not necessarily mean that 
there is no cartel. The cartel could have been established during a phase of price reduction as 
well. Previous methods would fail to detect such cases. 
In  this  paper,  we  develop  appropriate  empirical  methods  and  provide  evidence  on 
different cartel cases. Therefore, we first assume that cartels need negotiation time to change 
prices. This holds for the formation phase and for reactions to exogenous shocks.
1 Secondly, 
established cartels are more likely to react with price raises, in contrast to price reductions, 
even if they fail their steady-state level. To analyze these hypotheses, we add kurtosis and 
skewness to the first moments. We expect leptokurtic price change distributions around zero, 
                                                            
1 For the description of cartel behaviour during the formation-phase see Blanckenburg and Geist (2009).   
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because of delays in price changes during the cartel phase (and therefore more “near-zero 
changes”,  in  contrast  to  a  competitive  benchmark).  Furthermore,  we  expect  a  positive 
skewness for the cartel phase, which implies that positive price changes occur relatively more 
often than negative ones. Additionally, we employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a 
non-parametric (distribution-free) test comparing two distributions. In fact, the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two 
samples. 
Hence, antitrust authorities may be able to detect cartels, due to specifics in price-
change distribution. Adding to previous studies, we analyze numerous cartel cases, which 
yields  new  evidence  of  cartel  behaviour.  All  cartels  concern  Germany  and  the  relevant 
organisations were recently prosecuted by the European Commission. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we discuss the theoretical background and 
hypotheses. Secondly, we present the data we used for our analysis. Thirdly, the empirical 
results are presented. The final section concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
Price dispersion has been the focus of both regulatory and academic efforts to identify 
collusive behaviour.
2 Collusion leads to multiple changes in industry structure and behaviour 
that are expected to affect price dispersion. First of all – if we assume a cartel operates as a 
multiplant monopolist – there is an increase in market concentration. Stigler (1964) states that 
price dispersion is ubiquitous, even for homogenous products. It takes place when different 
suppliers offer different prices for the same good on a certain market. Carlson and McAfee 
(1983),  Fershtman  (1982)  and  Dana  (2001)  show  that  price  dispersion  is  greater  when 
                                                            
2 For a good overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion and price dispersion see Harington 
(2005).  
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industry concentration declines. Furthermore, according to Connor (2005), cartels usually fix 
prices either by announcing list prices to buyers and agreeing to sell only at this price or by 
agreeing to sell at some lower “floor” (minimum) price or at a “target” (average) price below 
list. Some cartels also agree to eliminate or restrict discounts, which reduces the variance of 
prices.  There  is  some  empirical  support  for  this  hypothesis.  Abrantes-Metz  et  al.  (2006) 
examine the effects of a bid-rigging cartel in frozen perch sold to the U.S. Department of 
Defence. As a result, they find a relatively small difference in price, but a huge difference in 
variance, when comparing the collusive and competitive regimes. The average price dropped 
23%  after  the  conspiracy  was  detected,  but  even  more  significant,  the  variance  of  price 
increased by 145%, compared to the variance during the cartel period. For the lysine cartel, 
Bolotova  et  al.  (2008)  find  support  for  the  hypotheses  that  the  mean  increases  and  the 
variance decreases in the cartel period. relative to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. Citric 
acid prices in this study, confirm the mean price hypothesis, but fail to support the variance 
hypothesis. The variance was even higher, compared to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. 
Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) find a significant lower variance in price changes for the 
cartel period of the German cement industry, compared to the pre- and post-cartel periods.  
However, looking at the first two moments might not be sufficient. If there is a trend 
in prices, for example, because of continuously increasing oil prices, the comparison of means 
and price variances could be biased by the length of the cartel period and the length of the 
competitive  one.  To  identify  the  difference  in  price  setting  behaviour  –  if  possible, 
independently of market characteristics – it is important to compare the entire distribution of 
price changes.  
Therefore,  we  extend  the  discussion  to  the  third  (skewness)  and  fourth  moment 
(kurtosis). We assume that cartels change their prices less often, compared to a competitive 
benchmark. That is because of slow decision processes within a cartel and a certain slackness  
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of  cartels  regarding  adjustments  to  demand  and  supply  shocks.  Price  changes  have  to  be 
negotiated by cartel members, which extends the time of adaptation. Hence, 
H1: the distribution of price changes under a cartel has a higher peak around zero. 
Furthermore,  for  the  cartel  period,  it  is  plausible  to  assume  that  price  changes  are 
positively correlated with positive demand shocks. Positive demand shocks increase the profit 
maximizing price and the profit maximizing quantity, and therefore, the cartel members have 
an incentive to adjust their agreement, which leads to a positive correlation. The adjustments 
to  negative  demand  shocks  are  more  difficult,  because,  if  cartel  members  cannot  reliably 
observe the quantities of other members, they are not able to differentiate between demand 
fluctuations and cheating. Therefore, price decreases after a negative demand shock could be 
misunderstood by other cartel members as cheating, and may cause price wars (Green and 
Porter  1984,  Abreu  et  al.  1986).  We  assume  that  cartels  increase  prices  to  achieve  the 
monopolistic level and furthermore prefer price increases as adjustments to positive demand 
shocks. Hence, 
H2:  the  distribution  of  price  changes  under  a  cartel  has  a  higher  positive  (or  less 
negative) skewness. 
The both hypotheses, the expected prices and price changes during cartel and competition are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
3 Data Description 
 
This  study  uses  monthly  price  indices  from  the  German  Federal  Statistical  Office 
(GFSO) of selected industries from 1976-2009. The price indices are calculated by the GFSO 
using sales-weighted prices of industry members. All used cartel industries are classified by 
the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE). This  
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classification is designed to categorize data.
3 The presented cases were prosecuted by the 
European antitrust authority.
4 We focus on major cartels containing German market segments. 
Table  1a  lists  the  analyzed  product  markets  by  data.  We  show  the  NACE  code  of  these 
products and in brackets the NACE code of used price data. As is evident, exact data is not 
available for all cases (e.g. Hydrogen peroxide and perborate; Monochloracetic acid). We 
indicate the period in which price data is available and point out the cartel-phase within this 
period. Finally, we show, in Table 1b, the companies involved and the total fines imposed by 
the European Commission. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
 
In order to detect whether cartel pricing is different from the competition pricing let us 
first  observe  the  distribution  of  price  changes  under  competition  (continuous  black  line) 
compared to the distribution of price changes under cartel (dotted gray line) — see Figures 2a 
and 2b. One can immediately see that under cartel the price changes are much less volatile 
and very densely concentrated around the mean. 
This impression becomes even stronger when one examines the descriptive statistics 
of the price changes under competition (Table 2) and cartel (Table 3). Both tables report the 
first four moments of the corresponding distributions: mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis.  
First, the means of most products both under competition and under cartel appear to be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero (see Tables 2 and 3). Under competition, there are 
only  three  products,  for  which  the  null  hypothesis  of  mean  equal  to  0  can  be  rejected: 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate and Monochloroacetic acid, and Vitamins. Under cartel, the 
                                                            
3 The NACE-Classification is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic 
Activities (ISIC Rev.2). Parts of ISIC Rev.2 were insufficiently aggregated to represent and monitor European 
national economics, so any necessary adjustments were made. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.  
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null can be rejected only for Vitamins. In all these cases, the means are greater than zero. In 
addition, when competition and cartel are compared, the means are significantly different only 
for two products: Hydrogen peroxide and perborate and Monochloroacetic acid at 5% and 
1%, correspondingly (see Table 4). 
Second, the variances of price changes under cartels seem to be substantially lower 
than under competition. This applies to all the products. These differences in volatility are 
significant in all cases, but three: Monochloroacetic acid, Plasterboard, and Synthetic rubbers 
— as Table 4 shows. 
Third,  under  competition,  the  distribution  of  prices  changes  of  four  products  are 
skewed:  three  negatively  (Coffee,  Plastic  industrial  bags,  and  Synthetic  rubbers)  and  one 
positively (Vitamins) — see Table 2. Under cartel, the distributions of seven products out of 
ten are skewed: six positively and only one negatively — see Table 3. Negative skewness 
implies that the negative prices changes occur relatively more often than the positive price 
changes. These observations are in accordance with what one would have expected, since the 
cartels are much less inclined to price decreases than the competitive firms. 
Fourth, under competition, the distributions of nine products out of ten are leptokurtic 
implying that they have more acute peaks. The only product, whose distribution has zero 
excess  kurtosis  is  Marine  Hose.  Under  cartel,  only  seven  distributions  out  of  ten  are 
leptokurtic. The three exceptions are: Hydrogen peroxide and perborate, Monochloroacetic 
acid, and Plastic industrial bags. In addition, in all cases, save three (Gas insulated switchgear, 
Marine Hose, and Synthetic rubbers), the distributions of price changes under competition are 
more acutely peaked than those under cartel. This appears to be at odds with what we saw in 
Figures 2a and 2b. However, this can be explained by the fact that the distributions depicted 
in these two figures are not standardized (that is, not divided by the standard deviations) and  
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the price changes under cartel, as we saw above, are significantly less volatile than under 
competition.  
Hence, none of the above descriptive statistics, with an exception perhaps of variance, 
can be considered as a robust test allowing to distinguish between competition and cartel. 
Such a test must be in a position to capture the anomalous difference between the competition 
and cartel distributions, that we saw in Figures 2a and 2b. 
Therefore,  we  decided  to  employ  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test,  which  is  a  non-
parametric  (distribution-free)  test  comparing  two  distributions.  In  fact,  the  Kolmogorov–
Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two 
samples. The null hypothesis of the test states that both samples are drawn from the same 
distribution. Formally, the test statistic is defined as follows: 
0 1 sup| ( ) ( )|
x
D F x F x = - , 
where F0(x) and F1(x) are the empirical cumulative distribution functions constructed for each 
of the two samples being compared. In words, the empirical cumulative distribution functions 
are compared (as absolute differences of function values) in each point of distribution support 
and then the largest absolute difference is taken as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. 
When  this  supremum  absolute  difference  exceeds  certain  critical  value,  the  null  of  two 
samples being drawn from the same distribution is rejected. 
The results of the bootstrap version of the traditional Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the 
“raw” and demeaned data are reported in Table 4. In the former case the null hypothesis is 
rejected for all the products. However, when applied to the demeaned data the test fails to 
reject the null in two products: Hydrogen peroxide and perborate and Monochloroacetic acid. 
Recall that these two products were the only ones, for which data is available only on a higher 
aggregate NACE-level (see Table 1a). Obviously, the results are biased because of the data 
mismatch.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  the  distributions  of  price  changes  under  the  
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Our paper implements the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the differences in 
behaviour  during  collusive  and  non-collusive  periods.  We  use  prices  from  ten  recently 
discovered conspiracies. The empirical results confirm that 8 out of 10 cartels were successful 
in controlling the market price for a number of years (for two cartels, no representative data is 
available). 
Following  Harrington  (2005),  we  argue  that  negotiations  lead  to  delays  in  price 
changes.  We  confirm  this  hypothesis  empirically  and  show  that  the  distribution  of  price 
changes under a cartel has a higher peak around zero (H1). The results confirm that none of 
the  descriptive  statistics,  with  the  possible  exception  of  variance,  can  be  considered  as  a 
robust test, which differentiates between competition and cartel. Especially for markets with 
price  trends,  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  is  required  to  detect  different  price  change 
behaviour.  Hence,  we  are  able,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies  (e.g.  Bolotova  2008),  to 
implement different market structures in the cartel detection analysis. Furthermore, we find 
some evidence to support the hypothesis that the distribution of price changes under a cartel is 
positively skewed (H2). In comparison to the competition phases, 7 out of 10 distributions of 
price changes under a cartel are positively skewed. However, the results should be confirmed 
by further empirical analysis.  
An important direction of further research would be to examine the applicability of 
proposed screens for collusion. This paper shows how markets with different structures could 
easily be analysed in a general screening. Additionally, it is necessary to develop methods for  
 
  10
generating the initial suspicion of a collusive period. If so, the presented test can be used to 
substantiate such suspicion. 
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Data Period  Nall  Cartel Period  Ncartel 
Coffee  108311 
(108311)  01/1976- 07/2009  402  01/2000- 06/2008  102 
Copper Tubes_Copper Fittings  244426 
(244426)  01/2000-07/2009  103  05/1988-03/2001  48 
Gas insulated switchgear  271210 
(271210)  01/1995- 07/2009  175  1988- 2004  113 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate  201363 
(2013)  01/1995- 07/2009  175  01/1994- 12/2000  71 
Marine Hose  221930 
(221930)  01/2000- 07/2009  103  1986- 2007  84 
Monochloroacetic acid  20143220 
(2014)  01/1995- 07/2009  175  01/1984- 05/1999  52 
Plasterboard  236210 
(236210)  01/1995- 07/2009  175  1992- 1998  36 
Plastic industrial bags  222211 
(222211)  01/2000- 07/2009  103  01/1982- 06/2002  29 
Synthetic rubbers  201710 
(201710)  01/1995- 07/2009  175  05/1996- 11/2002  79 
Vitamins  21105 
(21105)  01/1985- 07/2009  295  10/1989- 02/1999  113 
 
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics of cartel cases by companies and fines 
 








Mueller Industries, Austria Buntmetall, Boliden AB, Boliden Cuivre Zinc, 
Buntmetall Amstetten, Deno Acquisition, Deno Holding Company, Europa 
Metalli SpA, HME Nederland BV, Halcor SA, IMI Plc, KM Europa Metal AG, 
Mueller Europe Ltd, Outokumpu Oyj, Tréfimétaux SA, WTC Holding 




Schneider Electric, ABB Ltd, AREVA T&D AG, AREVA T&D Holding SA, 
AREVA T&D SA, Alstom, Areva SA, Fuji Electric, Fuji Electric System, 
Hitachi Europe Ltd, Hitachi Ltd, Japan AE, Mitsubishi Electric, Nuova Magrini 
G, Siemens AG, Siemens AG Österreich, Siemens Transmis Ltd, Siemens 





Degussa AG, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Akzo Nobel NV, Arkema SA, Caffaro, 
Chemoxal, Edison SpA, Eka Chemicals, Elf Aquitaine, FMC Corporation, FMC 
388 
                                                            
5 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf.   
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Foret, KEMIRA OYJ, L'Air Liquide, SNIA, Solvay NV, Solvay Solexis, Total 
SA 
Marine Hose  Yokohama Rubber Co, Bridgestone, Bridgestone Industri, ContiTech AG, 
Continental AG, Dunlop Oil & Marine, Manuli Rubber Indust, Parker Hannifin 




Hoechst AG, Akzo Nobel AB, Akzo Nobel Base Chem, Akzo Nobel 
Chemicals, Akzo Nobel Funct, Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Nederland, 
Arkema SA, Clariant AG, Clariant GmbH, Eka Chemicals, Elf Aquitaine 
217 
Plasterboard  BPB, Gyproc Benelux, Knauf W.G. KG, Lafarge SA  478 
Plastic 
industrial bags 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj, Armando Álvarez SA, BPI, Bernay Film Plastiqu, 
Bischof + Klein FR, Bischof + Klein GmbH, Bonar Technical Fabr, Cofira-Sac 
SA, Combipac BV, FL Smidth & Co A/S, FLS Plast A/S, Fardem Packaging 
BV, Groupe Gascogne, JM Gesellschaft, KV Stempher CV, Kendrion NV, Low 
& Bonar plc, Nordenia IAG, Nordfolien GmbH, Plásticos Españoles, RKW, 




Bayer AG, DOW Deutschland Inc, Dow Chemical Company, Dow 
Deutschland, Dow Europe GmbH, Eni SpA, Kaucuk as, Polimeri Europa SpA, 
Shell NL Chemie BV, Shell Nederland BV, Shell Petroleum NV, Trade-Stomil 
Ltd, Unipetrol as 
519 
Vitamins  BASF AG, Aventis SA, Daiichi, Eisai Co Ltd, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Kongo 
Chemical Co, Lonza AG, Merck KGaA, Solvay Pharmaceutic, Sumika Fine 
Chemical, Sumitomo Chemical Co, Takeda Chemical Ind, Tanabe Seiyaku Co 
855 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of price changes in case of competition 
Product  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis 
  statistic  p-value  statistic  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value 
Coffee  0.045  0.735  5.361  -0.773***  0.001  8.476***  0.000 
Copper Tubes_Copper Fittings  0.915  0.251  41.149  0.580  0.188  5.824***  0.002 
Gas insulated switchgear  0.061  0.556  0.654  0.439  0.324  4.460**  0.033 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate  0.352**  0.030  2.630  -0.041  0.904  4.669***  0.009 
Marine Hose  0.281  0.258  1.775  -0.241  0.676  3.611  0.227 
Monochloroacetic acid  0.337**  0.037  3.111  0.191  0.550  5.013***  0.002 
Plasterboard  -0.071  0.653  3.375  -0.415  0.182  6.454***  0.000 
Plastic industrial bags  -0.065  0.784  4.767  -0.947**  0.026  6.552***  0.000 
Synthetic rubbers  0.249  0.155  2.848  -1.153***  0.007  10.517***  0.000 
Vitamins  0.164**  0.033  1.044  3.028***  0.000  21.045***  0.000 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics of price changes in case of cartel 
 
Product  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis 
  statistic  p-value    statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value 
Coffee  0.090  0.269  0.664  1.164***  0.005  7.261***  0.000 
Copper Tubes_Copper Fittings  -0.023  0.908  1.851  1.274**  0.028  5.293**  0.010 
Gas insulated switchgear  -0.066  0.192  0.281  -0.594*  0.093  10.910***  0.000 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate  -0.081  0.576  1.452  0.115  0.779  3.604  0.194 
Marine Hose  0.094  0.421  1.106  3.250***  0.000  27.719***  0.000 
Monochloroacetic acid  -0.467**  0.033  2.258  0.305  0.520  3.296  0.392 
Plasterboard  -0.089  0.741  2.399  1.287**  0.046  5.814***  0.007 
Plastic industrial bags  0.089  0.238  0.148  0.375  0.536  2.918  0.684 
Synthetic rubbers  0.015  0.932  2.488  3.471***  0.000  24.433***  0.000 
Vitamins  0.126***  0.000  0.107  1.226***  0.002  6.523***  0.000 
Note: significance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
 
 














  t-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value D-statistic  p-value  D-statistic  p-value 
Coffee  -0.287  0.775  8.018***  0.000  0.135**  0.045  0.221***  0.000 
Copper Tubes_Copper Fittings  1.152  0.253  22.086***  0.000  0.348***  0.000  0.241*  0.051 
Gas insulated switchgear  1.107  0.271  2.346***  0.000  0.205**  0.019  0.363***  0.000 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate 2.008**  0.046  1.803**  0.010  0.204**  0.027  0.118  0.487 
Marine Hose  0.693  0.492  1.639*  0.083  0.210**  0.077  0.452***  0.000 
Monochloroacetic acid  3.025***  0.003  1.362  0.217  0.298***  0.003  0.083  0.897 
Plasterboard  0.059  0.953  1.377  0.279  0.260***  0.021  0.260**  0.032 
Plastic industrial bags  -0.622  0.535  31.403***  0.000  0.266**  0.048  0.312**  0.016 
Synthetic rubbers  0.940  0.349  1.142  0.546  0.263***  0.002  0.176*  0.087 
Vitamins  0.467  0.641  9.686***  0.000  0.203***  0.000  0.574***  0.000 
Notes: significance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 
1 Welch two-sample test 
2 F-test for comparison of two variances 
3 H0: no cartel  
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Note: Simulation of prices during i) Competition phase: N1-100,250-400( =100;σ
2=6,25). ii) Cartel Formation Z100-
140(stepwise raising prices). iii) Cartel Phase Z141-250(price reaction with lag) 
H1: the distribution of price 
changes under a cartel has a 






Figure 2a. Distributions of price changes during cartel and no cartel phase 
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